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In 2014 the economic activity of Latin America grew at a rate of 1.3%, the lowest of the 
past decade except for 2009 when the region felt the brunt of the global financial crisis. 
This performance prolonged a four-year low-growth phase that was triggered mainly by 
external factors (such as the end of the commodity price boom or the decline in the 
momentum provided by China) but in which domestic factors have loomed increasingly 
large, particularly in the main South American economies. Thus in 2014 the continued 
decline in the terms of trade (which accelerated in the second half of the year for the oil 
exporting countries due to the oil price slump), the weak foreign demand (particularly from 
China) and the tighter external financial conditions were among the key determinants of 
the sluggish activity in the region. However there were also domestic factors contributing 
to the low growth, such as the fall in investment against a background of worsening 
confidence or, in some cases, the application of restrictive macroeconomic policies. 
Against this backdrop, in 2014 two countries (Brazil and Venezuela) were hit by “technical” 
recessions of varying intensity; another two (Chile and Peru) underwent significant dips in 
growth to annual rates of 1%-2%, well below their potential rate, while Colombia and 
Mexico showed greater resilience in the year as a whole.
Inflation remained relatively high on average in the five countries with stated inflation 
targets, in a setting of exchange rate depreciation and in contrast to the consumer price 
containment at global level. There were, however, significant differences between countries. 
In Brazil inflation rose significantly in early 2015 (to 8.1% year-on-year in March, due partly 
to the rise in administered prices), while in Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru year-on-year 
inflation was more moderate. A case apart are Argentina and Venezuela, with inflation rates 
of around 20% and 65% (the highest in the world), respectively, as a result particularly of 
monetary financing of the budget deficit.
The region is addressing the new economic scenario (change of monetary cycle in the 
United States, trend towards deceleration in China, low commodity prices) with some 
strengths, albeit also with vulnerabilities. Notable among the latter is the worsening of 
current account balances in many countries as a result of the decline in the terms of trade, 
not counteracted by exchange rate depreciation for the time being, except in Chile. The 
ability of monetary and fiscal policies to deal with a less favourable external environment 
and slowing domestic demand varies from country to country, but is generally considered 
to be less than in 2008 and 2009. Further, while the shocks currently affecting the region 
are of a more permanent nature or the output gap is closed, expansionary demand policies 
are not appropriate and the counter-cyclical policy response must be more limited. In any 
event, save in Brazil, monetary policies are now highly accommodative. The fiscal policy 
response is proving to be more heterogeneous, since in some countries it is moderately 
counter-cyclical, while in others it is clearly contractionary. The main strengths lie in the 
high levels of international reserves, the limited public-sector indebtedness and the 
(controlled) exchange rate flexibility. Despite this, the short-term outlook is for low growth 
on average across the region, due to the absence of external stimulus and the ongoing 
recessionary climate in certain large economies representing nearly 50% of the region’s 
GDP. Exchange rates are acting as the first shock absorbers (see Chart 1) and should help 
to adjust relative prices and the composition of demand. In any event, there is a need for 
structural reforms to restimulate growth based on factors less dependent on the foreign 
sector.
Introduction
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The performance of the world economy in 2014 H2 and so far this year has been shaped 
by three main inter-related developments: the deceleration of the Chinese economy and 
the change in its growth pattern, the sustained appreciation of the US dollar (driven by the 
divergence in the monetary policy cycles of the main advanced economies, with the euro 
area and Japan pressing ahead with their monetary expansion, while the United States 
may see interest rate rises this year) and the sharp fall in oil prices. Indeed, after some 
years of relative steadiness (around $110 per barrel of Brent), in summer 2014 oil prices 
started a dive which in mid-January 2015 culminated in lows of around $45 per barrel of 
Brent. They subsequently recovered to $60 per barrel and have held at somewhat below 
that level since mid-February. Food and metal prices showed a slightly downward trend in 
this same period.
The main advanced economies have performed relatively favourably and in recent months 
the cyclical divergences between them have narrowed somewhat as a result of Japan’s 
exit from its technical recession, the recovery in the euro area and slightly worse-than-
expected macroeconomic figures in the United States (although this economy’s buoyant 
prospects remain in place for the coming quarters). In these economies the strengthening 
has generally been underpinned by the recovery of private consumption, fostered by 
favourable monetary and financial conditions and by the increased purchasing power of 
households associated with improved labour markets and lower inflation. In contrast, 
business investment continued to show a certain weakness. Meanwhile, the behaviour of 
economic activity differed notably across the various emerging regions, partly reflecting 
the impact of the fall in oil prices, according to each economy’s reliance on this commodity. 
In particular, emerging Asia’s economies performed positively, although China continued 
its gentle slowdown, which proceeded in parallel with the rebalancing of the economy 
towards a more sustainable model which gives greater weight to domestic consumption.
With the exception of some emerging areas, inflation held at very low rates (negative in 
some cases), which allowed numerous central banks both of advanced and emerging 
economies to intensify the expansionary stance of their monetary policies, in contrast to 
the expected tightening of interest rates in the United States.
The monetary policy divergences of the main central banks and the fall in oil prices shaped 
the behaviour of the international financial markets. Until mid-January there were increases 
in volatility, driven by diverse factors: political uncertainty in Greece, risks associated with 
the drop in oil prices (doubts as to the resilience of some oil exporting economies and the 
External environment
SOURCES: National sources and JP Morgan.
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risk of deflation in some developed economies) and geopolitical tensions, most notably in 
Russia. Subsequently, from end-January, the announcement of the ECB’s asset purchase 
programme and the expansionary measures adopted by other central banks, along with 
the partial rebound in and subsequent stabilisation of oil prices, mitigated investors’ risk 
aversion. In any event, throughout the period analysed, the divergence of the monetary 
policy cycles of the main advanced economies has been reflected in a higher increase in 
the volatility of foreign exchange markets than in that of other segments. In this respect, 
the dollar continued appreciating against the major currencies. By contrast, ten-year 
government debt yields did not reflect the differences between economies to the same 
extent, but rather declined across the board in the first part of the period, in a flight to 
quality, and subsequently rose slightly.
In turn, the emerging financial markets deteriorated sharply from the beginning of October 
2014, basically because of the oil price slump which particularly affected oil exporting 
countries. Thus some countries considered vulnerable, such as Russia, saw their most 
severe stock market falls and widening of sovereign spreads since the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, although other markets previously notable for the strength of their fundamentals, 
such as Mexico, Colombia or Malaysia, were also profoundly affected. In addition, the 
appreciation of the dollar lessened the appeal of carry trade transactions in the emerging 
markets and led to positions being unwound in the most liquid markets, initiating a period 
of capital outflows.
Against this background, the Latin American stock markets performed less favourably 
than those of the other emerging economies (see Chart 2), since commodity-related firms 
have a greater weight than in other regions. The Latin America dollar-denominated MSCI 
index fell by 22.6% between October 2014 and March 2015, compared with the decline of 
20.9% in eastern Europe or the rise of 4.6% in Asia. Excluding mining or oil-related sectors, 
the fall in the Latin America index is markedly smaller (see Chart 3). Notable in local 
currency terms is the fall in the stock markets of the countries most affected (commercially 
and fiscally) by the fall in oil prices and in commodities in general (see Chart 3), such as 
Colombia (where the market fell by 27% between October and March), Peru (with a drop 
of 22%) and Mexico (with a decline of nearly 10% to year-end, although the market 
subsequently recovered when oil prices bottomed out and began to recover slightly).
The fall recorded by Brazil (8% in the months examined) is more associated with 
idiosyncratic factors, such as the completion of the electoral process at end-October, the 
announcement of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies against a background of markedly 
weak activity, the difficulty in approving these adjustment measures in Congress, and the 
problems besetting the state oil company Petrobras, including the downgrading of its 
credit rating to below investment grade.
The sovereign spreads of Latin American countries similarly trended upward from October, 
increasing by nearly 130 basis points (bp) to end-March, a worse performance than that of 
the other emerging areas (increase of 100 bp in eastern Europe and no change or a slight 
decrease in Asia) (see Chart 2). Again, this performance was determined by the sovereign 
spreads of the oil exporting countries (see Chart 3), such that the sovereign spread of the 
region excluding those countries widened by nearly 40 bp, compared with an increase of 
more than 350 bp for the oil exporting countries (80 bp excluding Venezuela). Argentina’s 
sovereign spread held steady or tended to narrow, in the absence of any news on external 
debt default since summer 2014, while Venezuela’s reached all-time highs as the oil price 
slump eroded the country’s main strength (its current account surplus) and the level of 
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liquid reserves dropped below the external debt payments scheduled for 2015, raising the 
probability of default. The sovereign spreads of Chile and Peru widened moderately (by 
17 bp and 30 bp, respectively) in view of their relatively low levels of vulnerability, while that 
of Brazil increased by nearly 100 bp for the idiosyncratic reasons described earlier. Long-
term bond yields on local markets did not, on the contrary, show significant upward 
movements and generally remained at the levels reached after the May 2013 turmoil.
In keeping with the behaviour of sovereign spreads, the credit risk premia reflected in CDSs 
increased throughout the region. In Venezuela the CDS premium rose by nearly 5,000 bp, 
meaning that from early January the markets are discounting a probability of default of 
100%. For Brazil and Peru, the premia would be compatible with a sovereign rating of BB-, 
two notches below the average rating of the region (BB+), and a downgrading of one notch 
with respect to October 2014. The markets are also factoring in sovereign rating downgrades 
in all countries, especially in Brazil (three notches, so it would lose its investment grade).
Between October 2014 and March 2015, exchange rates showed a general tendency to 
depreciate against the dollar, more sharply in Mexico (-12%), Colombia (-23%) and Brazil 
SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a Stock market indices in dollars.
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SOURCES: Datastream, JP Morgan, Bloomberg, Banco Central do Brasil and national statistics.
a Stock exchange indices in dollars.
b MSCI Latin America index in local currency.
c Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela.
d 10-year government bonds in local currency.
e 5-year interest rate swap.
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(-25%, where the real dipped to 3.3 reais per dollar, its lowest level since 2003) than in the 
rest of the region (see Chart 3). In addition to the above, another factor in the depreciation 
of the Mexican peso and the Brazilian real was probably their more liquid and deeper 
financial markets, which are better equipped for currency hedge transactions than less 
liquid markets. The sharp depreciation of these currencies led to the reactivation of the 
official intervention programme in Mexico, to renewed interventions via swaps in Brazil 
(this programme was finally discontinued in March) and to the non-renewal of the dollar 
purchase programme in Colombia. In Venezuela a new foreign exchange market was 
started up in which foreign currencies can be freely bought and sold at exchange rates 
which are 96% lower than the official rate and near the parallel exchange rate, although the 
volume of transactions is very small. This behaviour of nominal exchange rates has passed 
through, at least in part, to real rates, reversing in some cases the loss of competitiveness 
accumulated since 2009 (see Chart 3).
The information available on capital flows indicates an appreciable moderation of capital 
inflows into the region in 2014. This is explained by the decline in direct investment, 
which is the non-callable component of financial flows. Thus direct investment inflows 
into Latin America as a whole amounted to $140 billion (in annualised terms) in 2014 Q4, 
compared with $175 billion in 2013 (see Chart 4). This fall to levels similar to those of 
SOURCES: Datastream, Dealogic, JPMorgan, IMF and national statistics.
a Short-term interest rate spreads against the dollar divided by the volatility of exchange rate options.
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mid-2011 arose basically from the decline in inflows into Mexico ($21.6 billion less than 
in 2013) and, to a lesser extent, into Brazil ($6  billion less). Thus the basic balance 
(percentage of the current account deficit covered by direct investment) worsened in 
nearly all countries, falling below 1 in Brazil, Colombia and Peru, indicating a greater 
reliance on debt to finance their growing external imbalances. However, portfolio inflows 
increased during the year in all countries, particularly in Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (in 
the latter two cases, in shorter-term instruments), although they moderated towards the 
end of the year, in keeping with the loss of the attraction of carry trade transactions in 
some of these markets (see Chart 4).
Finally, between October 2014 and March 2015, fixed income issuance by the region 
decreased substantially with respect to the previous six months (to $47  billion from 
$61 billion), basically as a result of the sharp fall in placements in Brazil, where the corporate 
sector issued only $1.1  billion, compared with more than $27  billion in 2014 H1. The 
absence from the market of Petrobras, which had raised $13.6 billion in the first six months 
of last year, largely explains this decrease; in fact, Petrobras has announced an asset sale 
programme to finance part of its operations. Contrastingly, placements in Mexico rose 
from $15.6  billion in April-September 2014 to $22.5  billion in the half-year under 
examination, with increased activity by the state oil company (43% of total issuance) and 
the government (39% of the total). So far the conditions of these issues have not changed 
substantially and in fact there has been a slight fall in primary market interest rates and a 
lengthening of maturities, with the exception of issues in Brazil, although, as noted above, 
their volume has been extraordinarily low.
Amidst the general trend of deceleration, the most notable features of activity and demand 
patterns in late 2014 were the unevenness of growth rates and the diversity of cyclical 
positions. In some countries, such as Brazil, the deceleration has probably not touched 
bottom. By contrast, in others, such as Chile, there are signs of steadiness and even of 
recovery of demand. Meanwhile, in Mexico, a recovery based on foreign demand continues 
to gather strength, although growth was lower than expected in 2014. These divergences 
between countries derive, firstly, from the differing momentum of their main trading 
partners (pick-up in the United States and slowdown in China) and, secondly, from agents’ 
expectations as to macroeconomic policy management and the boost to structural reforms 
(which seem to have been positive in Mexico and more uncertain elsewhere). Also, the oil 
price slump since October is impinging positively on the growth prospects of countries 
such as Chile which import most of the energy they consume, but extremely negatively on 
the activity and the external and fiscal position of some of the region’s main oil exporters 
(see Box 1). In a positive light, the exchange rate depreciation, insofar as it does not pass 
through to inflation, will foreseeably allow external demand to make a greater contribution 
to growth in 2015.
Specifically, the pace of change of activity in the region slowed further in 2014, since GDP 
grew by 1.3% in the year as a whole, 1.3 percentage points (pp) less than in 2013. The 
regional average for 2014 H2 indicates that growth stabilised at very low rates under 0.5% 
in quarter-on-quarter terms (see Chart 5). Thus the year-on-year GDP growth rates of the 
six main economies (excluding Venezuela, because its Q4 figure has not yet been released) 
went from 0.9% year-on-year in Q3 to 1.1% in Q4 (see Table 1). These low growth rates 
are largely explained by the marked weakness of the Brazilian economy, whose GDP fell in 
year-on-year terms by 0.6% in Q3 (revised down from the initial figure) and by 0.2% in Q4. 
For its part, Venezuela underwent a contraction in activity of nearly 3% in the year, albeit 
with an upward pattern throughout. The rest of the region exhibited uneven trends: Mexico 
Activity and demand
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Oil prices, which had shown a certain stability on international 
markets until mid-2014, began to fall in July, collapsing as from 
October. Specifically, the price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) – the benchmark for Latin American oil exporters – fell from 
$90 per barrel in September to $44 in mid-January 2015, although 
it has recently rebounded to over $55.1 The impact on Latin America 
of this shock differs greatly from country to country, given that 
some economies import practically all the oil they consume (such 
as Chile and some of the Central American countries), and in others 
oil is an export product (in the case of Venezuela, almost the 
only export good) and a source of substantial tax revenues. For 
the former, the decline in oil prices is a positive supply-side shock 
that raises agents’ purchasing power and generates gains in 
competitiveness, as it lowers output costs; moreover, by reducing 
expenditure abroad, the trade balance improves. For the latter, in 
contrast, a reduction in foreign revenues ensues and, therefore, a 
deterioration in the trade balance, with consequences for 
disposable income and also for public finances.
This Box analyses the effects of the decline in oil prices in three of 
the region’s main oil exporting countries: Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela. Although in the three instances the impact is adverse, 
there are highly significant differences between them. Firstly, 
because the predominant transmission channel is different: 
Colombia is chiefly affected by the trade channel, Mexico by the 
impact of tax revenues and Venezuela by both (see Panel 1). 
Secondly, because during the commodity boom years the reaction 
of the local oil industry and of the economy as a whole was 
different: in Colombia, the oil sector gradually gained in importance, 
to the extent that it now accounts for 5% of GDP; by contrast, in 
Mexico, where the economy is more diversified, the weight of the 
oil industry has systematically diminished, now also representing 
5% of GDP; lastly, in Venezuelan the oil industry is strategic (11% 
of GDP), but output has stagnated in the last six years. Thirdly, 
because the current macroeconomic situation and, therefore, 
economic policy leeway differ greatly.
A first sign of the scale of these effects is discernible in the downward 
revision of the expected GDP growth in these three countries. 
Indeed, an increase in activity of 3.6% is expected for Colombia in 
2015, compared with 4.8% in 2014; in Venezuela a contraction of 
7% is anticipated; and in Mexico’s case the expectations of a boost 
to medium-term growth induced by the energy reform approved 
some months ago have eased most appreciably.
BOX 1 THE IMPACT OF THE DECLINE IN OIL PRICES ON THE LATIN AMERICAN OIL EXPORTING ECONOMIES
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Crude oil sale price of Ecopetrol.
Country
Production
(bn bpd)
Average oil price
2014 Q4 ($)
% of exports % of tax revenue % of GDP
Mexico 2.2 66.3 11 30 5
Colombia 1.0 62.9 (a) 53 20 5
Venezuela 2.4 64.5 96 47 11
 
1  WEIGHT OF THE OIL SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY 
SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Estimated from 2011 central government data.
Country
Fiscal balance
as % of GDP
Current account 
balance
as % of GDP
Reserves
as % of GDP
Fiscal rule
(year of 
application)
Oil
stabilisation fund,
as % of GDP
Mexico -3.2 -2.1 15 2014 0.3
Colombia -2.4 -4.2 13 2014 0.2
Venezuela  (a) -14.9 +2.9 6 — —
  2  MACROECONOMIC SITUATION AND POLICY ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE 
1  Levels of $50 per barrel of West Texas intermediate (WTI) entail a 60% 
decline from the 2008 peak. However, it should be borne in mind that 
each country has its own price for the crude it exports, which will depend 
on its quality, transport costs, etc. For example, the Venezuelan mix has 
a price close to 10% below WTI; however, its rate of change is very 
similar to that of WTI.
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In a more detailed analysis, the biggest effect through the trade 
channel2 is seen in Venezuela, where a 10% decline in oil prices 
would entail a 6% drop in exports and a cut in the current surplus 
of 0.5% of GDP. Hence, the decline in oil prices since October 
would be on a sufficient scale to wipe out the current account 
surplus which the country ran before the shock (3% of GDP) and 
was considered the country’s main strength; however, the sharp 
contraction in imports, whose volume has fallen by almost 25% in 
the past two years, has acted as a counterweight. In Colombia, the 
trade balance worsened considerably, by more than 2 pp of GDP, 
taking the current deficit to a 15-year high (-4.2% of GDP). Lastly, 
the importance of this channel in Mexico is more limited, given 
that a 10% decline in the price of the Mexican mix accounts for 
only a 0.9% drop in exports. Nonetheless, the biggest risk 
associated with the decline in oil prices would stem from potentially 
lower foreign investment inflows under the energy reform launched 
last year, although certain amendments to the reform (tendering of 
shallow-water instead of deepwater areas) do try to increase the 
attractiveness for potential investors.
The impact of the fall in oil prices on the fiscal position of these 
countries depends not only on the change in price, but also on 
output, on the weight of oil revenues in total public revenues (see 
Panel 2) and on the exchange rate at which crude export revenues 
are converted into local currency.3 Thus, the depreciation of the 
exporting countries’ currencies against the dollar, which usually 
accompanies a decline in oil prices, partly mitigates the fall in oil 
revenues when these are recorded in the domestic currency. In 
this respect, Mexico and Colombia have flexible exchange rates 
– albeit with intervention rules – that have depreciated by 15% and 
25%, respectively, since October. Venezuela’s case is more 
complex, since there is a system of multiple exchange rates with 
an extremely overvalued official exchange rate, used, until some 
months back, to value oil-related tax revenues.
Bearing this in mind, in Colombia’s case estimates suggest that 
the fall in prices recorded since June would have reduced oil tax 
revenues by at least 10%4 in 2014, and the Government estimates 
an additional reduction of 60% in 2015, which would lead to a 
10% fall in tax revenues in the current year. In Mexico, the same 
decline in oil prices since June has reduced oil-related tax 
revenues by 42%, and total revenues by 13% in 2014. In the case 
of Venezuela, the impact of lower oil prices on the fiscal position is 
much more complicated to estimate, given the lack of official 
figures.5 In 2013, the latest year for which figures are available, oil 
revenues accounted for 46.6% of total central government 
revenues. These oil revenues, measured in nominal terms and in 
local currency, depend, as indicated earlier, on crude output and 
on the international price, and on the exchange rate at which 
PDVSA revenue is converted into national currency. Estimating the 
effect of these three variables with a very simple regression shows 
that the decline in oil prices since June would have given rise to a 
reduction in oil revenues potentially amounting to 45%, which 
would lead to a decline in total revenues of 21% in 2014.
The pass-through this decline in revenues to the budget deficit is 
not immediate, since it depends, in the first two cases, on the 
fiscal rules recently approved or amended, and on various 
mechanism set in place to insulate the public sector from the 
vagaries of oil prices. In fact, such mechanisms were introduced in 
Colombia and Mexico in 2011 and in 2013 (although both came 
into force in 2014), respectively. They envisage the accumulation 
of oil revenues in a sovereign wealth fund subject to specific rules, 
relating essentially to expected oil prices in the long run and 
potential output.6 The little time both systems have been in force 
has limited their ability to smooth fluctuations in public revenues 
associated with the recent decline in oil prices. Hence, the 
sovereign funds in both countries have built up a relatively small 
amount (scarcely 0.2%-0.3% of GDP), although under the escape 
clauses, in situations of cyclical weakness, the rule shall not give 
rise to a contractionary fiscal policy, which would further 
exacerbate such weakness. In Mexico, moreover, an active policy 
has been pursued for several years to insulate public finances as 
far as possible from changes in oil prices, through taking out a 
hedge position in the futures markets. In Venezuela’s case, the 
pass-through to the deficit is complicated, as only central 
government figures are available, to which should be added the 
effect on the other tiers of government whose revenues depend to 
a greater or lesser extent on oil, such as PDVSA and the various 
investment funds. In any event, the fall in prices has a bearing on 
what is already a very weak fiscal position, which the IMF quantifies 
as an overall general government deficit of 15% of GDP, and 
without any prior saving mechanisms.
BOX 1 THE IMPACT OF THE DECLINE IN OIL PRICES ON THE LATIN AMERICAN OIL EXPORTING ECONOMIES (cont’d)
2  In the trade channel only price effects are considered, since in the short 
term oil is difficult to replace with other products.
3  In the case of Venezuela it should be borne in mind, moreover, that the 
country has entered into several association agreements with Central 
American and Caribbean countries, and with China. These agreements 
envisage lower-than-market prices. Finally, another factor to be taken into 
account would be each country’s commodity exploitation market structure, 
and here the range is from State monopolies that transfer dividends to the 
Treasury (Mexico), through exploitation with strict rules to ensure most of 
the revenues for the State oil company (Venezuela) to more open markets 
with State investment that provides dividends to the State and foreign 
investment that pays specific royalties for operating in the country.
4  This amount includes only the withholding at source of the value of oil 
exports, in the absence of the figures on Ecopetrol dividends and other 
taxes on the oil sector.
5  The uncertainty over tax figures in Venezuela is very high, since the 
Ministry of Finance does not publish data for the whole of the public 
sector and for central government beyond 2011 and after 2013, 
respectively, when much of public spending in recent years has been by 
the State oil company PDVSA and the group of investment funds present 
in the country. Accordingly, the figures in this Box should be viewed with 
great caution.
6  For greater details on the Colombian rule, see J.C.Berganza (2012), 
Fiscal rules in Latin America: a survey, Documentos Ocasionales, No. 
1208, Banco de España; and on the Mexican rule, the Box on structural 
reforms in Mexico in the Report on the Latin American economy. Second 
half of 2014, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, October 2014. 
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showed somewhat greater dynamism (with year-on-year growth of 2.2% in Q3 and 2.6% 
in Q4), Colombia and Peru saw a certain additional slowdown, and Chile an incipient 
recovery in the last quarter, although from very low growth rates (see Chart 5).
By component, the regional average data show that domestic demand contributed only 
0.4 pp to year-on-year growth in Q3, although the contribution amounted to 0.9 pp in Q4 
(see Chart 6), while foreign demand contributed around 0.2 pp in Q4 compared with 0.5 pp 
in Q3. This lower contribution stemmed from a fall in exports (-1.8% at regional level), 
which was partially offset by the fall in imports (-0.9%). The divergence between the 
behaviour of exports in Brazil, with a year-on-year fall of 10.7% in Q4, and Mexico, with an 
increase of more than 10% year-on-year in Q4, reveals, among other things, the different 
growth prospects in their main trading partners (upward in the United States and downward 
in China). On the negative side, Colombia recorded a fall of 2% in its exports in Q4, owing 
to the slump in the price of its main export.
Gross fixed capital formation contributed negatively to growth, although in Q3 and Q4 it 
showed a certain recovery. However, in this component there were growing differences 
across countries. In Mexico, the growth rate rose significantly thanks to its private 
component (9.9% year-on-year in Q4), perhaps partly associated with the structural 
reforms and with the vigorous foreign demand from the United States. In Chile, where the 
uncertainty stemming from the approval of the tax reform dissipated, the adjustment of the 
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America 6 as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America 6: all the countries represented, except Venezuela; Latin America 5: all the countries represented, except Argentina and Venezuela.
b Seasonally adjusted.
c 2014 inflation is calculated as the cumulative figure since December 2013.
d Four-quarter moving average.
2015
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q3 Q4 March
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 6 (a) 2.7 1.3 2.2 3.7  2.9  2.4  2.7 0.6 0.9 1.1
    Argentina 2.9 0.5 1.3 5.2  3.3  1.7  0.8 0.7 0.0 0.4
    Brazil 2.7 0.1 2.6 3.9  2.4  2.1  2.7 -1.2 -0.6 -0.2
    Mexico 1.4 2.1 1.0 1.8  1.6  1.1  2.0 1.6 2.2 2.6
    Chile 4.2 1.9 5.4 4.0  4.8  2.8  2.7 2.1 1.0 1.8
    Colombia (b) 4.9 4.6 2.8 4.7  6.1  6.1  6.4 4.3 4.2 3.5
    Venezuela 1.3 0.8 2.6  1.1  1.0  -4.8 -5.0 -2.3
    Peru 5.8 2.4 4.4 6.2  5.2  7.2  5.0 1.8 1.8 1.1
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 5 (a) 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.7
    Argentina (c) 10.6 22.6 10.8 10.4 10.5 10.7 6.9 13.5 18.2 22.6 —
    Brazil 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.1 5.8 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.5 8.1
    Mexico 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 3.6 4.1 4.2 3.1
    Chile 2.1 4.4 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.5 3.2 4.5 4.7 5.3 4.2
    Colombia 2.0 2.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.8 2.9 3.5 4.6
    Venezuela 38.5 57.3 22.6 33.0 43.4 52.9 53.3 55.6 57.5 61.3 —
    Peru 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.0
Budget balance (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America 6 (a) -2.4 -4.0 -2.1 -2.2 -2.5 -2.4 -2.6 -3.0 -3.6 -4.2
    Argentina -1.9 -2.5 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -2.0 -2.0 -2.1 -2.3
    Brazil -3.3 -6.7 -2.8 -2.8 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.7 -4.9 -6.7
    Mexico -2.3 -3.2 -2.0 -2.2 -2.8 -2.3 -2.8 -3.2 -3.4 -3.1
    Chile -0.7 -1.5 0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2
    Colombia -2.2 -2.6 -1.4 -2.5 -2.7 -2.2 -2.7 -3.6 -3.4 -2.6
    Venezuela — — — — — — — — — —
    Peru 0.5 -0.4 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.4
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (a) 40.1  41.4 40.1  40.2  38.6  41.3 41.8
    Argentina 32.6  32.1 31.7  32.5  33.2  37.9 36.1
    Brazil 56.7  63.5  59.4 59.0  58.2  56.7  57.5 59.0 61.9 63.5
    Mexico 31.1  33.4  29.3 29.7  30.3  29.9  31.8 32.0 32.9 32.0
    Chile 12.8  15.1  11.5 12.1  12.6  12.8  12.8 13.5 13.7 15.1
    Colombia 34.6  37.7  33.0 33.3  34.9  34.6  35.9 35.0 35.6 37.7
    Venezuela — — — — — — — — — —
    Peru 19.0  19.4  19.5 18.5 17.7 19.0 17.8 18.2 18.4 19.4
Current account balance (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America 7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6
    Argentina -0.8 -1.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -1.2 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9
    Brazil -3.4 -3.9 -2.8 -3.0 -3.4 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.9
    Mexico -2.4 -2.1 -1.6 -2.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.6 -2.5 -2.3 -2.1
    Chile -3.7 -1.2 -4.2 -4.2 -3.8 -3.7 -3.2 -2.7 -1.8 -1.2
    Colombia -3.2 -5.2 -3.5 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.5 -4.0 -4.3 -5.2
    Venezuela 2.3 — 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.8 2.9 2.2 —
    Peru -4.4 -4.1 -3.6 -3.9 -4.3 -4.4 -4.2 -4.4 -3.8 -4.1
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 7 22.6 20.0 19.6 19.8 20.4 23.5 24.0 24.2
    Argentina 22.6 25.8 23.0 21.7 22.9 21.8 28.6 26.6 26.6 25.8
    Brazil 13.8 14.8 14.6 14.1 13.7 13.8 13.6 14.3 14.2 14.8
    Mexico 20.1 21.8 19.1 18.7 19.3 20.6 20.8 21.1 21.0 21.8
    Chile 47.3 56.8 43.5 42.9 44.4 47.2 48.7 50.4 52.3 56.8
    Colombia 24.2 26.8 21.5 22.0 23.7 24.2 25.0 25.6 26.1 26.8
    Venezuela 56.1 43.4 46.1 49.6 56.1 58.1 59.2 61.7
    Peru 29.2 31.7 30.5 29.6 29.3 29.3 30.1 30.5 31.1 31.7
20142013
2013 2014
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1  
investment cycle over the last two years seems to be coming to an end and investment 
went from falling at rates above 12% to rising at 0.5% year-on-year in Q4. In Colombia, 
investment slowed moderately in Q4 as a result of the adjustment in the construction and 
infrastructure sector, and to a lesser extent in the oil sector, but even so it continued to be 
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the fastest-growing component of demand. By contrast, in Brazil investment dropped 
sharply in H2 (-6.1% on average), against a background of falling business confidence 
indicators which did not regain ground after the elections. Both the announcement of a 
procyclical economic policy adjustment and the uncertain extent of the impact of factors 
SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Latin America 6 as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
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such as the corruption scandals in the state oil company Petrobras seem to be behind this 
performance. In Argentina and Venezuela the import restrictions gave rise to sharp falls in 
investment, in machinery and equipment in the former and in construction in the latter.
The behaviour of private consumption over the six-month period was, by contrast, 
somewhat more uniform across the region. On average in Latin America private 
consumption continued to slow, posting a growth rate near to 1.5% in 2014 as a whole 
(compared with 3% in 2013), although recovering somewhat in Q4 (1.8%, compared with 
1.2% previously). Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela all recorded low or even negative 
growth rates in H2, while in Colombia and Peru consumption continued to show its 
robustness. In Mexico, consumption recovered towards the end of the year, posting a rate 
of 2.7% year-on-year. The general situation of most labour markets remained healthy, as 
evidenced by unemployment rates near their historical lows (5.4% of the labour force in 
the region on average at end-2014). However, job creation generally showed signs of 
weakness and fell, in line with previous quarters, to rates below 1% (see Chart 7). Some 
countries, such as Brazil, saw jobs destroyed in the six-month period. In Mexico, by 
SOURCES: National statistics and Datastream.
a Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. 
b Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.
c Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
d Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
e Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
f Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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contrast, job creation in the formal sector strengthened considerably, and simultaneously 
informal employment decreased. Real wages buoyed up consumption, since they grew in 
most countries; in some cases (such as Brazil) unemployment transfers and support for 
low income households also increased significantly; in turn, lending to the private sector 
slowed (in Brazil, in the sectors most closely linked to private consumption, such as credit 
cards) (see Chart 7). Finally, it should be noted that government consumption lent some 
momentum to growth in Brazil and Chile and in the more vulnerable countries (see Chart 6).
The trade surplus of the region decreased by 0.2 pp of GDP to 2014 Q3 (see Chart 8), 
owing to the smaller surplus of Venezuela. Excluding that country, the region’s trade 
account remained virtually in balance until Q3 (+0.1% of GDP), although in 2014 Q4 and 
the opening months of 2015 it showed a deficit, owing to the behaviour of nominal exports, 
which fell in the regional aggregate by nearly 10% year-on-year (see Chart 8). This fall was 
attributable to the oil price slump, but also to the contraction in exports to China (particularly 
those of Brazil), which was barely offset by an increase in exports to the United States. The 
current account deficit held steady at around 3% of GDP in regional average terms, owing 
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics and central banks.
a Customs data in dollars. 
b Latin America 6.
c Four-quarter moving average.
d Estimate of adjusted balances, setting export and import prices as the average from 1990 to 2007. In the cases of Chile and Peru, a fixed level in the income 
balance has been estimated as a percentage of GDP.
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to a slight improvement in the income balance (associated with lower profit repatriation by 
foreign firms in the commodities sector) and an increase in transfers received. By country, 
the deficit decreased slightly in Mexico and Peru and, above all, in Chile, but worsened in 
the rest. The recent decline in the terms of trade narrowed the difference between the 
region’s current account balance and the current account balance adjusted for the change 
in terms of trade (see Chart 8).
Finally, the most frequent indicators for 2015 Q1 suggest that the aforementioned intra-
regional divergences remain. Thus, industrial output posted rates of change around -2%, 
as a result of developments in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru, while in Colombia and 
Mexico the rates remained positive. Retail sales rose strongly in Mexico and Colombia, 
while they decelerated in Brazil. In the countries for which PMI indices are published, the 
trends in Q1 are upward, except for Brazil, albeit starting from levels that are still very low 
compared with the historical average.
In the past six months, since the publication of the previous Report on the Latin American 
Economy, inflation in the five countries with inflation targets steadied, on average, at relatively 
high levels, standing at 5.7% year-on-year in March 2015 (see Chart 9). In fact, at end-2014, 
only in Colombia and Brazil had consumer prices remained within, albeit towards the top of, 
the band set by their central banks (see Table 2). The regional average masks, however, an 
increase in the divergences across countries with respect to the first half of 2014.
In Brazil, inflation rebounded in March to 8.1% year-on-year, the highest level in the last 
ten years and more than 1.5 pp above the upper bound of the range. Part of this increase 
is a result of rises in some administered prices (which increased by 13.3% year-on-year in 
March) against a background of fiscal adjustment, and the impact is, in principle, temporary. 
However, the various inflation components continued to evidence pressures to a greater or 
lesser degree, since the core rate stood at 8% year-on-year and the rate of change in non-
tradable goods prices at 7.5% and in the price of services (excluding those with regulated 
prices) at 6.1%. Thus only tradable goods showed a certain moderation in 2014 H2, to 
5.7% year-on-year in March. This is particularly noteworthy because it took place against 
a background of sharp exchange rate depreciation, a symptom of weak domestic demand.
In the other countries with inflation targets, the general trend was one of either deceleration 
or stabilisation. In the former case are Mexico (3.1% year-on-year in March) and Peru (3% 
year-on-year), with inflation at the central bank’s target and no evidence of pass-through of 
exchange rate depreciation. In Chile and Colombia inflation remained at the top of the target 
range, at 4.2% and 4.6% year-on-year, respectively, in March, evidencing the effect of 
exchange rate depreciation. In both cases, part of the pressure on prices has passed through 
to core inflation, although medium-term inflation expectations remain anchored. The impact 
of the oil price slump on inflation was noticeable especially in oil importing countries such as 
Chile, Peru and, to a certain extent, in Argentina also. In Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and 
Brazil petrol prices are administered (and subsidised) and the final impact on consumer prices 
is smaller (see Chart 9). Argentina and Venezuela continued to post very high inflation rates, 
above 20% and 60% year-on-year, respectively, against a background of monetary financing 
of the budget deficit, although inflation moderated somewhat in Argentina in early 2015 
against a backdrop of standstill in activity, exchange rate stability and falling oil prices.
In this setting, the divergences observed in monetary policies in 2014 H1 increased (see 
Chart 9). The central bank of Brazil (which in April had halted the upward interest rate 
cycle) intensified its monetary policy tightening after the October presidential election in 
Prices and economic 
policies
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order to lend more credibility to the inflation target (4.5%). The rise of 125 bp to 12.75% in 
the official interest rate, on top of the previous rise of 375  bp, makes the monetary 
adjustment strongly procyclical in the short run. Despite this, the exchange rate has 
continued to depreciate (reaching 3.3 reais per dollar), making a cumulative depreciation 
of 30% in the past year and of more than 50% since the beginning of 2011, contained by 
the central bank’s exchange rate intervention programme. Also, the government announced 
SOURCES: Datastream and national statistics.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
b Banco de España calculations stripping out the food and energy indices from the overall index.
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cuts in the state funding to public development banks (whose loan market share has 
reached 50%) and two increases in the lending rates of those banks (to 6%). 
In the other countries with inflation targets, Mexico and Colombia held their official interest 
rates unchanged in the past six months, while the central bank of Chile trimmed its official 
interest rate by 25 bp to 3% in October and the central bank of Peru did so twice, by 50 bp 
each time, to 3.25%. Both in Mexico and, above all, in Chile and Peru, monetary policies 
have been expansionary over the past year and a half, and only in Colombia, which ended 
its upward interest rate cycle in mid-2014, has monetary policy been more neutral. 
Interestingly, in all four countries the projections are for inflation to decrease or at least 
steady in 2015, and yet while in Colombia and Peru the markets are factoring in the 
possibility of new interest rate cuts (more likely if stable terms of trade were to halt the 
exchange rate depreciation), in Mexico the market is discounting an interest rate rise in 
accordance with the US monetary cycle. In Chile expectations have changed in the past 
month and no longer discount official interest rate cuts.
Exchange rate depreciation has been an important factor for monetary policy in most 
countries, since although attempts have been made to help real exchange rates adjust to 
lower terms of trade, Peru and, recently, Mexico have intervened in the foreign exchange 
market, selling reserves to smooth these trends, and Colombia has completely discontinued 
its reserve accumulation programme. In addition, Peru has used macroprudential policy to 
reduce its vulnerability to depreciation of the sol (making debt denominated in foreign 
currency more expensive than that denominated in national currency).
Meanwhile, in the fiscal policy arena, the end of 2014 saw, practically without exception, 
an across-the-board widening of budget deficits (or, in the case of Peru, the evaporation 
of the budget surplus) (see Chart 10). This was mainly a result of the poor revenue 
performance owing to the cyclical position and the fall in commodities-related receipts, 
although in some countries it was also a result of expanded government spending, which 
helped to sustain household income and private consumption. In Brazil the deficit widened 
substantially in 2014 to 7% of GDP, and with a view to 2015, despite the political difficulties, 
the authorities are trying to implement a fiscal adjustment, which will have procyclical 
effects in the short term but which is necessary to put public finances back on a firm 
footing and strengthen their credibility in the medium term. In the other countries the fiscal 
worsening in 2014 was less pronounced. For 2015, in Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile 
the existence of fiscal rules should bestow a countercyclical or acyclical nature on fiscal 
policy, thereby isolating to some extent the fiscal accounts from commodity price fluctuations 
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a March 2015 Consensus Forecast for the end of the year.
Country Target December Fulfillment March Expectations (a) Expectations (a)
Brazil 4.5 ± 2 6.4 Yes 8.1 7.7 5.5
Mexico 3 ± 1 4.1 No 3.1 3.1 3.4
Chile 3 ± 1 4.6 No 4.2 3.0 3.0
Colombia 3 ± 1 3.7 Yes 4.6 3.5 3.1
Peru 2 ± 1 3.2 No 3.0 2.6 2.6
2014 2015 2016
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2 
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(see Box 2). Even so, the responses differ. In Colombia and Peru the fiscal rule, the 
stabilisation funds, and, above all, the low level of government debt have prevented a 
procyclical adjustment (additional to that envisaged in medium-term consolidation plans) 
despite the fall in oil, copper and other metal prices. In Chile fiscal policy is determined, 
firstly, by the tax rise under the recently approved tax reform, and secondly, by the desire 
to carry out an expansion to counteract the fall in growth, with a sharp increase in this 
year’s investment budget. Also, the projected deficit has been relaxed to -1.9% of GDP, 
although the target is still to reach a balanced budget (in terms of the cyclically-adjusted 
balance) in 2018. Mexico has announced an expenditure adjustment for both 2015 and 
2016, against a background of falling oil prices and falling oil production, as a signal to the 
markets that the risk that a part of the oil slump may be permanent will not induce it to 
resort to greater indebtedness in a situation of change in the global financial cycle.
Over the period analysed, headway was made in trade liberalisation, both globally, with the 
signing of the Trade Facilitation Agreement that re-opens the Doha Round negotiations, and 
regionally, with renewed momentum in the area of influence of the Pacific Alliance. Thus, 
progress was made at different levels (start of conversations, completion of parliamentary 
Trade and reforms
SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies, as a GDP-weighted average of the region.
b In Venezuela, 2012 quarterly data estimated from annual data. In 2013 and 2014 aggregate excluding Venezuela.
c Latin America 5.
d Latin America 6.
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The use of fiscal policy as a business cycle smoothing tool represents 
a historical challenge in Latin America. In the empirical literature, 
fiscal policy has systematically been found to behave procyclically 
for Latin America (i.e. the application of an expansionary fiscal policy 
when the cycle is buoyant and a contractionary policy when the 
economy is in recession), as occurs in other emerging economies. 
The intensity of the procyclical bias is exacerbated in Latin America 
by the relative insubstantiality of the automatic stabilisers, low 
revenue-raising capacity and the dependence of public revenues on 
commodities exports, and also by external financial conditions that 
amplify economic fluctuations. In particular, the high dependence of 
the Latin American countries on external financing and episodes of 
sudden stops in capital inflows, against a backdrop of exchange rate 
rigidities, have traditionally given rise to procyclical fiscal policy 
responses, especially in downturns.
However, a change in behaviour can be seen in recent years. In 
particular, during the global financial crisis Latin American economies 
held up particularly well, with counter-cyclically geared macroeconomic 
policies to alleviate the effects of the crisis. Moreover, a significant 
institutional change in budgetary terms was observed from the onset 
of the new millennium, in the form of the implementation of a more 
BOX 2FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE FACE OF THE CHANGE IN FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
AND THE APPLICATION OF FISCAL RULES
SOURCES: IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset, CEPAL, OECD and Banco de España.
a Output gap coefficient in a MCO regression with a 7-year rolling window and a 90% confidence interval. A negative (positive) coefficient denotes a procyclical 
(counter-cyclical) fiscal policy.
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robust fiscal framework involving the adoption of rules in many 
countries in the region (see Panel 1). These fiscal rules have been 
developed with various aims. In some countries they seek to restrict 
the growth of debt or the primary deficit in order to enhance the 
sustainability of public finances in the medium and long term, while 
in others the aim is the stabilisation of the cycle and the generation 
of fiscal space in upturns so as to be able to undertake fiscal 
expansions in recessive times. The creation of sovereign funds 
drawing on commodities revenues in Chile, and more recently in 
Colombia and Mexico, and the introduction of medium-term 
structural balance sheet objectives are some of the economic policy 
developments linked to these fiscal rules.
In order to be able to assess the fiscal policy stance in Latin 
America, primary structural budget balances (i.e. excluding the 
interest burden and the impact of the business cycle from the total 
public balance) must be estimated and adjusted, moreover, for the 
impact of commodities prices, since many of the region’s countries 
depend to a greater extent on revenues from primary goods exports 
to balance their public finances, and their prices also show highly 
persistent temporary fluctuations. For a sample of eight of the main 
Latin American economies1 in the period 1990-2013, this Box 
shows primary structural balances adjusted for the price of 
commodities – using OECD and IMF methodology2 – and assesses 
whether the change in external financing conditions, on one hand, 
and the introduction of fiscal rules, on the other, have provided for 
a shift towards a fiscal policy able to smooth the business cycle.3
Panel 2 shows the primary structural balance and the output gap 
in the countries analysed, as an arithmetic mean. As can be seen, 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy situations are seldom observed in the 
period in question; i.e. periods in which either a positive output 
gap (economic expansion) is accompanied by a positive change 
(restrictive fiscal policy stance) in the primary structural balance, 
or a negative output gap (economic recession) occurs at the same 
time as the change in the primary structural balance turns negative 
(restrictive fiscal policy stance). However, there was a break in this 
pattern in 2009 due to the major fiscal impulse applied in response 
to the global financial crisis, and in the years immediately after the 
crisis there were some improvements in the primary structural 
balance in favourable economic circumstances. The prevalence of 
the procyclical fiscal policy stance in the region over the past 25 
years is corroborated by a simple econometric analysis, in which 
the primary structural balance is regressed on the output gap. In 
fact, Panel 3, which illustrates the changes in the coefficient 
measuring the cyclical response of fiscal policy in the form of a 
seven-year moving window together with confidence bands of 
90%4, shows that procyclicality in the region was relatively stable 
and significant up to the reaction to the 2009 crisis. Following the 
2009 fiscal impulse, the coefficient measuring the fiscal policy 
response to the cycle ceases to be significant, i.e. fiscal policy 
ceases to be procyclical and becomes acyclical.
To analyse changes in financial conditions in respect of the 
relationship between the fiscal policy stance and the cycle, the 
foregoing regression includes an indicator, derived from the literature 
analysing debt sustainability,5 which seeks to approximate the 
financial position of the public sector. This indicator is constructed as 
the primary structural balance that would stabilise the public debt/
GDP ratio in each period, given the implied yield paid by the public 
sector on debt issued6 and the growth of the economy. This variable 
takes into account financing conditions and the underlying fiscal 
situation, such that it measures the fiscal space of the authorities.7 
The results indicate that financing conditions significantly influence 
the cyclical response of fiscal policy. As can be seen in Panel 4, the 
procyclical nature of fiscal policy lessens once the influence of 
financing conditions is taken into account.
The impact of the introduction of fiscal rules on the fiscal policy 
response to the cycle is more difficult to evaluate. First, it is not 
easy to assess whether fiscal rules contribute to eliminating the 
counter-cyclical bias of fiscal policy or whether, on the contrary, 
their creation is part of a process in which improved institutions 
may be a step forward towards achieving fiscal discipline. Further, 
measurement of the quality of fiscal rules is an open issue. This 
study uses the IMF database8 to construct different de jure 
indicators of fiscal rules, without going into an assessment of 
either their suitability or the de facto compliance with the fiscal 
rules.9 The primary structural balance regression is estimated 
once again on the output gap, allowing the coefficient of this latter 
variable to differ depending on the existence or not of fiscal rules.10 
The results show that countries whose fiscal discipline is 
underpinned by a fiscal rule have been able to make progress 
towards eliminating the procyclical tendency of fiscal policy (see 
Panel 4). Whether this behaviour shows that fiscal rules function 
as a signalling mechanism of a commitment to a more stable fiscal 
policyremains open to discussion.
BOX 2 FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE FACE OF THE CHANGE IN FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
AND THE APPLICATION OF FISCAL RULES (cont’d)
1  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay.
2  See Daude, Melguizo and Neut (2011), “Fiscal policy in Latin America: 
counter-cyclical and sustainable?”, Economics: The Open-Access, 
Open-Assessment E-Journal, vol. 5, 2011-14.
3  Alberola, Kataryniuk, Melguizo and Orozco (2015), “The long (and 
unfinished) march towards fiscal policy stabilisation in Latin America: the 
role of financial conditions and fiscal rules”, mimeo.
4  A negative coefficient in the regression denotes procyclical behaviour of 
fiscal policy, and vice versa. 
 5  Alberola and Montero (2006), “Debt Sustainability and Procyclical 
Fiscal Policies in Latin America”, Economía, LACEA, Journal of the 
Latin American and Caribbean Association – 7 (1), pp. 157-193, autumn.
 6  Specifically, this variable is constructed as follows: TB=[(r-g)/1+g]*D(-1), 
where r is the average yield effectively paid, g is GDP growth and D(-1) 
the stock of debt in the previous period.
 7  The inclusion of this variable in the regression of the primary structural 
balance is potentially subject to a problem of endogeneity, since the 
financing conditions may also depend on the fiscal policy stance. To try 
and resolve this problem, an instrumental variables estimate is used.
 8  IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset. See A. Schaechter, T. Kinda, N. Budhina and 
A. Weber (2012), Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis – Towards the 
“Next-Generation” Rules. A New Dataset.
 9  See J.C. Berganza (2012), Fiscal rules in Latin America: a survey, 
Documentos Ocasionales, no. 1208, Banco de España.
10  So as to take into account the problem of endogeneity mentioned in 
footnote 7, an external instrument is used (durability of the political 
regime, obtained from the Polity IV database, to reflect the broader 
perspective of macroeconomic stability with a long-term approach by 
a more stable political regime).
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procedures, signing of agreements or entry into force) in the establishment of free trade 
agreements by Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Central America with Asian and European 
countries such as Turkey.
In the case of MERCOSUR, some progress was made in opening up towards other areas, 
with agreements signed to start negotiations with Lebanon, Tunisia, Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, in addition to South Korea and Pakistan, and ratification of the free trade offer 
made to the European Union in mid-2014 covering 90% of trade. Measures were also 
adopted to facilitate the free movement of goods and persons within the area, such as an 
arrangement to allow Uruguay and Brazil to trade with each other in their local currencies, 
further momentum for the Mercosur passport programme and acceleration of the process 
of accession for Bolivia. Chile put forward the possibility of the Pacific Alliance moving 
closer to MERCOSUR on matters not related to lower tariffs. By contrast, Argentina and 
Brazil renewed the restrictions on sales of cars with Mexico for another four years.
Turning to structural reforms, in Mexico new legislative initiatives were enacted to combat 
corruption and violence and to boost productivity, increasing integration between the 
production chains of SMEs and large corporations and promoting the funding of activities 
and projects that entail productive potential or investment in human capital. In addition, 
the new regulatory bodies of the various sectors affected by the reforms began to take 
shape and the Mexican Oil Fund was established. In Colombia a moderately broad tax 
reform was introduced that aims to close the revenue gap in the 2015 budget, raising 
income tax and creating a new wealth tax. Lastly, in Chile, an education reform guaranteeing 
free schooling and an electoral reform making the voting system more proportional were 
passed and it was announced that a labour reform, including measures to facilitate trade 
union membership, guarantee the right to strike and changes in employment contracts, 
would be put before Parliament before the end of the year.
With the review of the national accounts figures published in March, Brazil’s economy came 
out of “technical” recession in 2014 H2, growing by 0.2% and 0.3% in quarterly terms in Q3 
and Q4, respectively, although the year-on-year rates remained negative in the last three 
quarters of the year (-1.2%, -0.6% and -0.2%, respectively). Thus, growth in 2014 amounted 
to 0.2% (compared with 2.7% in 2013), on the back of continued weakness in domestic 
demand, which contributed just 0.1  pp to growth in 2014. The sharp contraction in 
investment continued (some 6% year-on-year in Q4), while private consumption posted 
moderate growth. External demand contributed 0.4 pp in Q4, with exports falling sharply 
(-10.7% year-on-year) owing to weak manufacturing and oil sales, by product, and to weak 
exports to China and the EU, by country. The higher frequency indicators for 2015 Q1 point 
to continued weakness in domestic demand, exacerbated by the effect of the most severe 
drought in decades. The labour market shows some signs of weakness, as job creation 
rates continued to fall, especially in manufacturing, even though the unemployment rate 
remained at all-time lows (partly owing to the decline in the labour force) and real wages 
rose by 2.4%. Inflation continued to climb throughout the year, closing 2014 at 6.4% year-
on-year, and in January 2015 it broke through the target range ceiling (+4.5%, with bands 
of +/-2%) as a consequence of the government’s adjustment of administered prices, 
reaching 8.1% year-on-year in March. Core inflation has rebounded, especially since the 
start of the year (8% in March), as have inflation expectations, which anticipate that inflation 
will not return to within the central bank’s target range until mid-2016. Against this backdrop, 
shortly after the elections the central bank surprised the markets by resuming official 
interest rate hikes, with a cumulative increase of 125 bp up to 12.75%, in an attempt to 
anchor inflation expectations. In addition, the volume of intervention by means of currency 
Economic developments 
by country
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swaps was first halved, and this instrument was then eliminated at the end of March. The 
Brazilian real depreciated by 14% against the dollar in the six-month period, reaching more 
than 3.3 reais per dollar in 2015 Q1, its lowest point since 2003. From the fiscal standpoint 
(see Chart 11), the primary balance stood at -0.6% of GDP in 2014, a sharp deterioration 
compared with previous years (1.8% of GDP in 2013) and short of the target for the year 
(+0.2% of GDP) which had already been revised down. However, the new government has 
announced a fiscal package consisting of expenditure cuts equivalent to 0.7% of GDP and 
tax increases equivalent to 0.4% of GDP. These measures aim to redress the fiscal accounts 
and restore credibility in the medium term, although in the short term they could have a 
negative impact on activity and drive up inflation in 2015. Turning to the external sector, the 
current account deficit widened to 4% of GDP in 2014 (compared with 3.6% of GDP in 
2013) as a result of the erosion of the trade surplus and the emergence of a modest deficit 
(0.2% of GDP) associated with the decline in the terms of trade and lower exports to China. 
In the financial account, portfolio inflows rose moderately, from 1.1% of GDP in 2013 to 
1.4% in 2014, taking advantage of Brazil’s higher interest rates. Moody’s placed the outlook 
on the sovereign rating to negative and Standard and Poors left it unchanged.
The Mexican economy grew by 2.1% in 2014, compared with 1.4% in 2013, recovering 
throughout H2, albeit at a slower than expected pace. On the demand side, exports continued 
to be the main growth driver (7.1% in Q3 and 10.3% in Q4), boosted by the growth in activity 
in the United States and its impact on the manufacturing industry (especially the automobile 
industry) (see Chart 11) which more than offset the decline in oil exports. Investment was the 
most dynamic component of domestic demand, growing by 2.3% in the year (compared with 
a fall of 1.6% in 2013), in view of the good performance of private investment (5%) which 
more than offset the decline in public investment (-7%). Private consumption remained weak, 
although the good performance of the labour market, which is benefiting from the plan to 
encourage employment in the formal sector, provided it with heightened momentum. Indeed 
the unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in Q4. The published data for 2015 Q1 point to growth 
rates similar to those seen in Q4, driven by external demand. At the end of the year inflation 
stood at 4.1% year-on-year, slightly above the upper bound of the central bank’s target range 
(3% ± 1%), with core inflation below the headline rate (2.4% in February) and inflation 
expectations for the medium and long term anchored around 3%. The Mexican peso 
depreciated in tandem with the decline in oil prices, reaching its lowest point for six years and 
triggering the automatic intervention rule to curb volatility. Subsequently, supply was increased 
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by a further $52 million per day at auctions with no minimum price, as downward pressure 
heightened. In this setting, the central bank has held official rates at 3% throughout the last 
six months, pointing to possible synchronisation of monetary policy with the Federal Reserve, 
and in consequence markets are factoring in the first rate increase for 2015 Q3. On the fiscal 
front, public finances worsened owing to the slowdown in revenue which was attributable, 
above all, to the 42% slide in oil revenue, despite the positive effect of the tax reform approved 
in October 2013 and the currency depreciation. Thus the deficit stood at 3.2% of GDP 
(compared with the target of 2.5%), almost 1 pp above the 2013 figure. Against this backdrop, 
in January the Mexican government announced public spending cuts of 0.7% of GDP for 
2015, particularly affecting current spending but also investments in Pemex and the Federal 
Electricity Committee, and further cuts for 2016.
In Argentina the weak activity that had characterised 2014 H1 continued in H2. GDP grew by 
just 0.1% and 0% in quarter-on-quarter terms in Q3 and Q4, respectively, meaning that in 
2014 overall GDP rose by 0.5%, compared with 2.9% in 2013. The key factor behind the 
weak activity levels in 2014 are the restrictions on manufacturing imposed due to import 
controls, which have had a particularly harsh impact on intermediate goods, against the 
current backdrop of trade and financial isolation and the scarcity of foreign currency. On the 
expenditure side, the rate of decline of investment accelerated year-on-year to 4.9% in Q3 
and to 9.7% in Q4, resulting in a fall of 5.6% in the year overall. Household consumption 
decreased by 0.5% in 2014, after a decade of growth over 3%, reflecting the exhaustion of 
domestic sources of growth. In turn, government consumption rose by 2.8% in the year 
overall (the lowest figure in a decade), after the rate of growth accelerated in Q4 to 3.8% year-
on-year. Conversely, the external sector’s contribution went from a negative 1.4  pp to a 
positive 1.4 pp as a consequence of the severe contraction (more than 12%) in imports, more 
than offsetting the decrease in exports (see Chart 12) which felt the brunt of the decline in the 
terms of trade and weak external demand, especially from Brazil, the country’s leading trading 
partner. The forecasts for 2015 point to a continued weak economic performance. In this 
setting, in 2014 the current account deficit widened to 0.9% (from 0.8% in 2013). In turn, 
international currency reserves stabilised around $30 billion, thanks to import controls and 
several currency swaps activated in Chinese yuan ($3.8  billion). The official inflation rate 
reached 23.9% year-on-year in December and although the fall in oil prices and the 
disappearance of the effect of the sharp devaluation in early 2014 are helping to smooth it, 
the continued monetisation of the budget deficit, which closed the year at over 3% of GDP, 
remains a significant upside risk factor. The increase in the budget deficit was a result of 
higher public spending (42% per annum), arising from subsidies to the private sector, which 
more than offset the higher revenue (41%). The official exchange rate depreciated by almost 
50% in 2014, closing the year at 8.1 pesos per dollar, although the rate of depreciation slowed 
in H2 and the gap with respect to the unofficial exchange rate narrowed. The expiry in 2015 
of the Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause relating to the restructured debt, which 
granted holders of restructured bonds the right to any improved terms granted to other 
creditors, did not prompt any change in the negotiations with the holdout creditors, meaning 
that the country remains in a situation of sovereign default on its restructured debt.
Chile saw a sharp deceleration in economic activity in 2014, although the pace of slowdown 
moderated in the closing months of the year and, especially, in early 2015. In 2014 overall, 
GDP grew by 1.9% year-on-year and the data for both 2013 and 2012 were revised up by 
0.1 pp, to 4.2% and 5.5%, respectively. In quarterly terms, the economy grew at a slightly 
faster pace (0.9%) in 2014 Q4, and in particular the rate of contraction of domestic demand 
moderated, driven by public spending (5.5% year-on-year) and by gross fixed capital 
formation which moved into positive territory (0.5% year-on-year) after five consecutive 
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quarters of markedly negative figures. External demand made a positive contribution 
(3.2  pp) to growth in 2014, as imports declined. The unemployment rate remained low 
(6.3% of the labour force). The trade surplus widened, triggering a very substantial correction 
in the current account deficit (1.2% of GDP, compared with 3.4% in 2013). In the financial 
account, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment rose. Inflation, which rebounded 
to 5.7% year-on-year in October, has moderated in recent months, partly as a result of the 
drop in oil prices, reaching the upper bound of the target range. The central bank has made 
one official interest rate cut since September, taking rates down 25 bp to 3%. On the fiscal 
front, in 2014 the deficit amounted to 1.6% of GDP (above the 0.9% estimated in the 
budget law) and the structural deficit to 0.5%, owing to higher spending, against a backdrop 
of cyclical slowdown and as a consequence of lower copper revenues (2% of GDP and 
10% of tax revenue), virtually half the 2011 figure. In the first year of the tax reform, the 
forecast increase in revenue (0.3% of GDP) was achieved. In 2015, tax revenue is forecast 
to grow by 2% of GDP thanks to the tax reform, with an effective fiscal deficit of 1.9% of 
GDP and a structural deficit of 1.1% of GDP. Both the stabilisation funds and the low 
sovereign debt continue to allow Chile to implement a counter-cyclical tax policy.
In 2014 Colombia posted the highest growth in the region, as GDP rose by 4.6% (compared 
with 4.9% in 2013). However the pace of growth slowed significantly in the course of the 
year, from 6.4% year-on-year in Q1 to 3.5% in Q4, as a result of the deceleration in 
domestic demand and, in particular, in government consumption and investment (even 
though, in the year as a whole, the latter was the most dynamic component, posting 
growth of almost 11%). The pace of growth of private consumption, however, accelerated 
in Q4, offsetting the slowdown in the other components. The contribution of external 
demand turned negative again in 2014 (-2.8 pp) as a consequence of the poor performance 
of exports (-1.7%), marked by the sharp slide in oil exports, which contrasted with the 
strong import performance (9.2%), reflecting the good investment momentum. Hence the 
trade deficit widened to 2.4% of GDP in the year (see Chart 12) and the current account 
balance deteriorated sharply (-5.2% of GDP, compared with -3.2% in 2013). In the financial 
account, direct investment fell as a result of lower investment in the mining and energy 
sector, but portfolio investment inflows rose by 68%. The Q1 indicators signal that the rate 
of growth will continue to slow, even though both credit and the labour market continue to 
perform well. Inflation, which at the end of 2014 was very close to the upper bound of the 
target range (+3%, with bands of +/-1 %), began to rise in the closing months of the year 
and continued to do so in early 2015, reaching 4.6% in March, as a consequence of higher 
SOURCES:  INDEC, Secretaria de Agricultura of Argentina and DANE.  
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food prices and the currency depreciation. In this setting, the central bank has left the 
official interest rate unchanged at 4.5% since September, following the rate increases in 
July and August, and has halted its dollar purchases on the currency markets. The 
exchange rate fell by more than 20% against the dollar in 2014, and has fallen by more 
than 8% in 2015 to March, against a backdrop of lower oil prices and the worsening 
growth outlook. In the fiscal arena, in 2014 Colombia met its structural deficit reduction 
target of 2.3% of GDP, recording a figure of 2.4%. For 2015, compliance with the fiscal rule 
initially demanded a tax increase in order to achieve higher revenues. However, in view of 
the expected decline in oil revenues, the government announced expenditure cuts of 3% 
and admitted a cyclical deviation of -0.6% in the budget update, entailing an increase in 
the budget deficit to 2.8% of GDP, which will be financed by issuing government debt.
In Peru the loss of economic momentum deepened in Q4, with growth of 0.4% in quarter-on-
quarter terms and year-on-year growth of 1%. In the year overall, GDP rose by 2.4%, well 
short of the 2013 figure (5.8%). By component, private consumption decelerated moderately, 
but investment fell by 2% owing to the contraction in mining output. External demand made 
a marginally positive contribution due to the import correction. The current account deficit 
narrowed in 2014, although it still stood at 4.1% of GDP, as the trade balance deteriorated, 
moving from a surplus to a deficit owing to the fall in metal prices. In 2015, activity and 
confidence indicators point to moderate economic growth rates at the start of the year. For its 
part, inflation eased to within the monetary authority’s target range, posting a year-on-year 
rate of 2.8% in February 2015. The central bank held interest rates unchanged, although 
certain macro-prudential measures were taken (local currency bank reserve requirements 
were lowered and limits were imposed on currency derivative operations), in a setting of 
depreciation of the new sol. Sales of dollars were also made to curb exchange rate volatility 
and new intervention measures were introduced using currency swaps. On the fiscal front, in 
2014 the public sector primary deficit was equivalent to 0.1% of GDP.
The Venezuelan economy recorded a very poor performance in 2014. Ahead of the release 
of the GDP figures for Q4, GDP fell by 4.9% year-on-year in H1 and by 2.3% in Q3. By 
component, this is attributable to the collapse in investment (-27.5% in Q1, -18% in Q2 
and -9.3% in Q3), against a backdrop of import restrictions as a result of the extreme 
scarcity of foreign currency. The poor performance of private consumption moderated in 
the course of the year, going from -4.2% in H1 to -1.6% in Q3, with both credit and the 
labour market continuing to perform reasonably favourably, despite the significant drop in 
real wages. Government consumption remained the most dynamic component, growing 
by 2.1% in Q3. The positive contribution made by external demand is explained by the 
decline in imports, although this contribution contracted sharply as the year progressed 
(from 13.1 pp in Q1 to 2 pp in Q3). The fall in oil prices is responsible for the decline of 
almost 10% in nominal terms in exports. Nevertheless, as imports also contracted, the 
current account surplus stood at 3% of GDP in Q3 2014 (slightly above the figure of 2.3% 
in 2013). In October 2014, international reserves amounted to 6% of GDP, but liquid 
reserves were less than $6 billion, as the majority of reserves are held in gold. Inflation 
soared to 65% in December (the latest figure released), in view of the shortage of foreign 
currency for imports, the increase in the money supply to finance the budget deficit and 
the effective exchange rate depreciation in view of the closure ordered of the SICAD I and 
SICAD II markets and the opening of a new parallel free-floating foreign exchange market 
(SIMADI) on which the currency traded 93% below the official exchange rate. The rating 
agencies downgraded the country’s sovereign rating to CCC.
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